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Abstract. The Multivariate Ring Learning with Errors (m-RLWE) prob-
lem was introduced in 2015 by Pedrouzo-Ulloa, Troncoso-Pastoriza and
Pe´rez-Gonza´lez. Instead of working over a polynomial residue ring with
one variable as in RLWE, it works over a polynomial residue ring in
several variables. However, care must be taken when choosing the multi-
variate rings for use in cryptographic applications as they can be either
weak or simply equivalent to univariate RLWE. For example, Pedrouzo-
Ulloa et al. suggest using tensor products of cyclotomic rings, in par-
ticular power-of-two cyclotomic rings. They claim incorrectly that the
security increases with the product of the individual degrees. In this pa-
per, we present simple methods to solve the search m-RLWE problem
far more efficiently than is stated in the current literature by reducing
the problem to the RLWE problem in dimension equal to the maximal
degree of its components (and not the product) and where the noise in-
creases with the square-root of the degree of the other components. Our
methods utilise the fact that the defining cyclotomic polynomials share
algebraically related roots. We use these methods to successfully attack
the search variant of the m-RLWE problem for a set of parameters es-
timated to offer more than 2600 bits of security, and being equivalent
to solving the bounded distance decoding problem in a highly struc-
tured lattice of dimension 16384, in less than two weeks of computation
time or just a few hours if parallelized on 128 cores. Finally, we also
show that optimizing module-LWE cryptosystems by introducing an ex-
tra ring structure as is common practice to optimize LWE, often results
in a total breakdown of security.
1 Introduction
In 2010, Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev introduced the Ring Learning with
Errors (RLWE) problem [12]. The main advantage of using this ring-variant of
the original LWE problem is that the schemes are much more efficient and the
size of the public keys is significantly smaller. Beginning in 2015, Pedrouzo-Ulloa,
Troncoso-Pastoriza and Pe´rez-Gonza´lez introduced the Multivariate Ring Learn-
ing with Errors (m-RLWE) problem in a series of papers [14,15,16]. Essentially
this does to module-LWE what RLWE does to LWE – by adding more structure
they are able to construct more efficient schemes with smaller key sizes.
In the simplest case of two variables they define the problem, which they call
the Bivariate RLWE (2-RLWE) problem, as follows:
Problem 1. Let Rq[x, y] = Zq[x, y]/(f(x), g(y)) be a bivariate polynomial residue
ring, with f, g monic irreducible polynomials over Z and an error distribution
χ[x, y] ∈ Rq[x, y] that generates small-norm random bivariate polynomials in
Rq[x, y], distinguish between samples (ai, bi = ai · s + ei) and (ai, ui) where
ai, ui ← Rq[x, y] are chosen uniformly at random from the ring Rq[x, y], and
s, ei ← χ[x, y] are drawn from the error distribution.
Although not explicitly stated in [14], f and g are taken to be two-power
cyclotomics, i.e. f(x) = xnx + 1 and g(y) = yny + 1 with nx and ny powers
of two. They claim and give a sketch proof that the 2-RLWE problem above is
equivalent to the RLWE problem in the ring Zq[z]/(h(z)) where h(z) = zn1n2+1,
however as will become obvious this is not true as we can solve the 2-RLWE far
more easily. The flaw is that while Q[z]/(h(z)) certainly contains isomorphic
copies of Q[x]/(f(x)) and Q[x]/(g(y)) it is not the smallest number field which
does so. If we assume n1 ≥ n2 then in this specific case Q[x]/(f(x)) itself has this
property. This shows that we expect to be able to solve the 2-RLWE problem
by solving max{n1, n2} dimensional problems, not dimension n1n2. This logic
can be made to work more generally with any cyclotomic fields, not just power
of two cyclotomics, as detailed in Section 3.1.
The authors then construct a method for encrypted image processing whose
security is based on the 2-RLWE problem. The sample parameters proposed for
use being n1 = n2 = 2
i, dlog2 qe = 22 + 3i for i = 7, 8, 9, 10. Using the lower
bound given in [11, Equation (5.2)] these instances are estimated to have bit
security 2663, 10288, 38880 and 146675 respectively, though these parameters
fall well outside the range of parameters for which the bound was derived so
these security levels so are unlikely to be accurate; however, using the LWE-
estimator of Albrecht et al. [1] gives even larger security estimates. Thus it is
clear the authors believe these parameter suggestions give a very high security
level. However, in light of our attack, which works here in dimension n1 = n2,
the LWE-estimator gives the estimated security levels as 32, 33, 35 and 98 bits
respectively.
Further, in [15] the same authors reformulate the m-RLWE problem in terms
of the tensor product of number fields and consider the ring R now as the tensor
product of the corresponding rings of integers. They proceed by generalising the
security reductions of Lyubashevsky et al. from RLWE to standard problems on
ideal lattices to the multivariate case, now reducing them to multivariate ideal
lattice problems.
Finally, in [16] the same authors build upon the m-RLWE problem, this
time specialised to power-of-two cyclotomics, and give a number of useful multi-
dimensional signal processing operations and optimizations for use with their
m-RLWE based homomorphic encryption scheme.
Although Pedrouzo-Ulloa et al. appear to have come up with the m-RLWE
problem to deal with multidimensional signals the problem is natural in its
own right. As mentioned above it is a rather natural optimization of module
LWE (M-LWE), first introduced in [4] where it is called the General Learning
with Errors (GLWE) problem. This module structure is used in cryptographic
primitives such as the NIST submissions Saber [6] and Kyber[3]. For a ring R,
samples from the module LWE distribution are of the form (a, b) where a← Rnq
is uniformly sampled and b = 〈a, s〉+ e mod q where e← χ is sampled from an
error distribution and s ∈ Rnq is the secret vector. LWE is the case when R = Z
and RLWE is when n = 1 but now the ring R is a polynomial residue ring. Thus
in going from LWE to RLWE we replace the inner product of vectors by the
product of polynomials (modulo some polynomial modulus).
As such Module LWE bridges the gap between LWE and RLWE, but is
still not as efficient as RLWE. It is thus tempting to replace the inner prod-
uct in M-LWE by a product of polynomials, just like RLWE, but where now
the coefficients are from a polynomial residue ring (in an independent variable)
rather than simply integers. We thus reach the 2-RLWE problem and it is then
straightforward to generalise to m-RLWE.
In this paper we give a simple assessment of the security of the m-RLWE
problem and present an efficient attack when the polynomial moduli are related
in a certain way. The basic idea of the attack is to apply a number of “smallness”
preserving ring homomorphisms which reduce the problem to standard RLWE
problems, of much lower dimension, and with a slightly larger error distribution.
Solving the search variant in each case gives us enough information to recover the
secret in the original m-RLWE problem. For example, for the 2-RLWE problem
above with n1 ≥ n2 the problem is reduced to n2 instances of the RLWE problem
in dimension n1, the same modulus q and with the noise growing only by a factor
of
√
n2. This attack shows that the stated hardness of the problem is much lower
than that asserted in the current literature coming from RLWE in dimension
n1n2.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we recall
the required background and in Section 3 we define the m-RLWE problem and
show that in many cases it simply is the standard RLWE-problem. In Section 4
we present our attack on the remaining cases of m-RLWE and the results of
our implementation, and in Section 5 we remark that the standard optimization
trick going from LWE to RLWE, when applied to module-LWE often results in
a total breakdown of security. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let [n] denote the set {0, 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. For a commutative ring R and an
element r ∈ R we denote by (r) the principal ideal of R generated by r; namely
(r) = {rs | s ∈ R}.
2.1 Subgaussians
We also require the notion of a subgaussian random variable. We follow the
approach in [13, Section 2.3] and say that, for any δ ≥ 0, a random variable X
over R is δ-subgaussian with parameter s > 0 if for all t ∈ R we have
E(e2pitX) ≤ epis2t2+δ.
If δ = 0 then we drop the refernce to this and say that the random variable X is
subgaussian with parameter s. We also use the same notation for the probability
distribution of X. It is a simple exercise to show that the sum of subgaussian
distributions is also subgaussian:
Lemma 1. Let δi, si ≥ 0 and suppose that we have random variables Xi which
are δi-subgaussian with parameter si. Define X to be random variable that is the
sum of the Xi and set δ =
∑
i δi and s =
(∑
i s
2
i
)1/2
then X is δ-subgaussian
with parameter s.
We can also apply Markov’s inequality to the δ-subgaussian random variable
X with parameter s which shows that
Pr(|X| ≥ t) ≤ 2e−pit2/s2+δ.
2.2 RLWE variants
Here we also introduce the distinction between the so-called dual- and primal-
RLWE problems as well as the polynomial RLWE problem. The starting point
for the first two problems is a number field K and its ring of integers OK and
an integer modulus q ≥ 2. Typically K is a cyclotomic number field but this
need not be the case. Samples are of the form (ai, bi) where bi = ais + ei and
ai ∈ OK/qOK is sampled uniformly at random and ei is sampled from an error
distribution on KR := K ⊗Q R. The difference between the two cases is that
in the dual-RLWE case the secret s is sampled from the dual fractional ideal
O∨K/qO∨K while in the primal-RLWE case it is sampled from OK/qOK . Finally,
in the PLWE case ai, s ∈ Zq[x]/(f) for some irreducible polynomial f and the
error term is an element of R[x]/(f).
The actual problems come in two variants, a decision version where one has to
determine whether the second component of the samples is computed correctly
or chosen randomly as in Problem 1, and a search version where one is asked to
find s.
It has been shown by Ducas and Durmas [7] for cyclotomic fields, and by
Rosca, Stehle´, and Wallet [17] more generally, that one can reduce dual-RLWE
to primal-RLWE with only a limited growth in the error term. Also in [17] they
show that the reduction can be extended from primal-RLWE to PLWE. Since
cyclotomic number fields are monogenic, that is the ring of integers is generated
by one element over Z, and we are primarily interested in the cyclotomic case, for
simplicity, we will not worry too much about distinguishing the various problems.
2.3 Search RLWE as a BDD problem
In this section we recall a simple and well-known lattice attack on the search
variant of the RLWE problem by considering it as a special case of the bounded
distance decoding problem (BDD). The attack works given enough samples and
is practical for low dimensional problems.
Suppose we are given ` samples {(ai, bi)}i∈[`] from the RLWEq,Ψ distribution
and suppose we are working in the ring R = Zq[x]/(f(x)), deg(f) = n. Then
we know that if s is the secret polynomial we have bi = sai + ei for some
ei with small coefficients. We can rewrite this as a vector-matrix equation by
replacing the elements of R by their (row) vector of coefficients (with respect to
the standard power basis in x) which we denote in bold; if Mai is the matrix of
multiplication by ai then we have bi = sMai + ei. Since s is the same for each
sample we can concatenate all of the samples into one equation:(
b1 · · · b`
)
= s
(
Ma1 · · · Ma`
)
+
(
e1 · · · e`
)
.
This is an instance of the bounded distance decoding (BDD) problem in the q-ary
lattice L spanned by the rows of (Ma1 · · · Ma`) (with entries taken as integers)
and qIn`; the target vector being v = (b1 · · · b`). Any BDD-solver, such as
Kannan’s embedding technique [10] or Babai’s nearest plane algorithm [2], can
thus be used to solve search RLWE. Two samples will in practice uniquely define
s and the more samples one has the better the chance of solving the problem.
Since we will use the BDD-solver as a black box in our algorithm, we simply
refer to the excellent tool of Albrecht et al. [1] which can be used to estimate
the running time of these algorithms.
3 The m-RLWE Problem
In [15] the authors define the multivariate RLWE distribution, in its dual for-
mulation, in terms of a tensor product of number fields K =
⊗
i∈[`]Ki where
each Ki is a cyclotomic field; not necessarily distinct. The ring R used is now
the tensor product, R =
⊗
i∈[`]OKi , where OKi is the ring of integers of the
number field Ki. Further, one defines an integer modulus q ≥ 2 and denotes by
R∨ the dual fractional ideal of R, then T = KR/R∨.
Definition 1 (Multivariate RLWE distribution). For s ∈ R∨q and an error
distribution ψ over KR, a sample from the m-RLWE distribution As,ψ over Rq×
T is generated by a ← Rq uniformly at random, e ← ψ, and outputting (a, b =
(a · s)/q + e mod R∨).
One can then define the multivariate RLWE search and decision problems in
the standard way.
Definition 2 (Multivariate RLWE Search Problem). Let Ψ be a family
of distributions over KR. Denote by m-RLWEq,Ψ the search version of the m-
RLWE problem: given access to arbitrarily many independent samples from As,Ψ
for some fixed uniformly random s ∈ R∨q and ψ ∈ Ψ , find s.
Definition 3 (Multivariate RLWE Decision Problem). Let Γ be a distri-
bution over a family of error distributions, each over KR. The average-case-
decision version of the m-RLWE problem, denoted by m-R-DLWEq,Γ , is to
distinguish with non-negligible advantage between arbitrarily many independent
samples from As,φ, for a random choice of (s, ψ) ← U(R∨q ) × Γ , and the same
number of uniformly random and independent samples from Rq × T.
Here U(R) denotes the uniform distribution on R.
3.1 Decomposition of m-RLWE and the compositum field
It is well known that the n-th cyclotomic ring (respectively field) can be split
using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) into a tensor product of prime-
power cyclotomic rings (respectively fields), these prime powers being those ap-
pearing in the factorisation of n. In the case of rings, if we denote the j-th
cyclotomic polynomial by Φj , we have that if the prime power factorisation of n
is n = pe11 · · · pe`` then,
Z[x]
(Φn(x))
∼= Z[x]
(Φpe11 (x))
⊗ · · · ⊗ Z[x]
(Φpe``
(x))
.
If ψ is the isomorphism from the right hand side to the left, and we have
an instance of the m-RLWE problem in the right hand tensor product of rings
modulo q then lifting the coefficients to Z, applying ψ and reducing modulo q
will give an instance of the RLWE problem since ψ(q) = q and ψ is a linear
map when considering the rings as Z-lattices. Furthermore, this map is “small-
ness” preserving so the resulting error distribution is still a distribution of small
elements, though possibly with some degradation in precisely how small. As a
result we obtain the following: the m-RLWE problem for cyclotomic fields with
defining polynomials Φni is only distinct from the RLWE problem when the ni
are not all pairwise coprime.
Going back to the more general case of arbitrary number fields Ki the way to
view the problem is via the notion of the compositum of fields, in our case this
is the smallest number field which contains isomorphic copies of each Ki. Then
there is a natural algebra homomorphism from the tensor product of the Ki to
the compositum. We can then distinguish two cases: the first case is the so called
linearly disjoint case: the map is injective (and as such automatically bijective
in our case) and so the tensor product and the compositum are isomorphic. We
remark this is only true in terms of number fields themselves and not the corre-
sponding rings of integers. However, only when this map is not injective is the
m-RLWE problem distinct to the RLWE problem and this is the crux of the flaw
in the reduction from m-RLWE to RLWE given in [15]. Instead of having to solve
a lattice problem in the tensor product of fields whose dimension is the product
of the degrees of the defining polynomials one can work in the compositum field
where the lattice problem now has dimension the degree of the compositum as a
number field which can be much smaller. For well behaved number fields which
can be used in advanced cryptographic primitives such as somewhat homomor-
phic encryption the natural linear map from the tensor product of the Ki to the
compositum is again somewhat “smallness” preserving so that the correspond-
ing RLWE problems in the compositum field may still have small enough error
polynomials to be able to mount an attack against them.
Since the RLWE problem is widely deemed to be a hard problem in large
dimensions, we will only be interested in the case when the fields Ki are not
linearly disjoint. The simplest case of this for cyclotomic fields is when m = 2
and the two fields are prime-power cyclotomic fields for the same prime. In
particular we will focus on the prime 2 as this is a very popular choice.
4 Attacks
4.1 A distinguishing attack
Our attack is inspired by the “evaluation at one” attack and its variants on non-
standard decisional RLWE problems [8,9,5]. These attacks work if the defining
polynomial f of the ring R = Z[x]/(f(x)) has a small root modulo q, say f(θ) ≡ 0
mod q. Then evaluation at x = θ is well defined and guessing the value of s(θ) one
can test if e(θ) = b(θ)−a(θ)s(θ) is distributed according to the error distribution
evaluated at θ. This requires e(θ) to be distinguishable from uniform, which it
is if e(θ) remains small enough, hence θ should also be small, e.g. θ = ±1.
Note that evaluation at θ is equivalent to reduction modulo the ideal gener-
ated by x − θ and on further reduction by q the ring is non-trivial if and only
if f(θ) and q are not coprime. To stand any chance of distinguishing though,
f(θ) and q should have a large common factor so that the quotient ring is not
too small; this is the case when f(θ) ≡ 0 mod q. More generally, for the attack
to succeed we really only need that Z[x]/(f(x), q, x − θ) = Z/(f(θ), q) is large
enough to distinguish the distribution of e(θ) from uniform.
In our setting the ring R is equal to Z[x, y]/(f(x), g(y)) so we look for an
ideal I of R such that I and (q) are not coprime. In particular, viewing R
as Z[x]/(f(x))[y]/(g(y)) we can try to find a root of g(y) modulo q in the
ring Z[x]/(f(x)). If such a root θ(x) exists one can try to distinguish between
e(x, θ(x)) = b(x, θ(x))−a(x, θ(x))s(x, θ(x)) coming from genuine m-RLWE sam-
ples and e(x, θ(x)) coming from uniformly random samples.
Example 1. As a small example let us take f(x) = x4 + 1 and g(y) = y2 + 1.
We look for a solution to y2 + 1 ≡ 0 mod q in the ring Z[x]/(x4 + 1). It is easy
to see that a solution is y = x2, hence we have found a root. Thus the mapping
a(x, y) 7→ a(x, x2) is a ring homomorphism from Z[x, y]/(x4 + 1, y2 + 1) to
Z[x]/(x4+1). The error polynomials will be sampled coefficient-wise with respect
to the standard power basis xiyj which we use throughout this paper. Thus
writing e(x, y) =
∑3
i=0
∑1
j=0 ei,jx
iyj we see that under this homomorphism the
error polynomial e(x, y) is mapped to
3∑
i=0
1∑
j=0
ei,jx
i+2j = (e0,0 − e2,1) + (e1,0 − e3,1)x+ (e2,0 + e0,1)x2 + (e3,0 + e1,1)x3.
We thus see that the image of the error polynomial also has small coefficients as
they are just a signed sum of two of the original coefficients and is in particular
distinguishable from random for large enough q. This means a distinguishing
attack can be successfully mounted against the decisional m-RLWE problem in
this setting.
We can in fact go a step further in the above example as y = −x2 is another
solution to y2 + 1 ≡ 0 mod q. This may not seem to add much but using this
second solution we can perform an attack on the search variant of the problem
making the attack much more powerful. More generally, having multiple roots
may make a direct attack on the search variant feasible.
4.2 Multiple roots
Take the example of the 2-RLWE problem of Problem 1 with f(x) = xn1 + 1
and g(y) = yn2 +1 for n1 and n2 powers of two so that without loss of generality
we can assume that n2 | n1 and let k = n1/n2. Here we have many roots of g(y)
in Z[x]/(f(x)) even before reducing modulo q. Namely we have g(x(2i+1)k) = 0
for i ∈ [n2] and each of the roots is distinct. We can thus define the map
Θ : Z[x, y]/(f(x), g(y))→ (Z[x]/(f(x)))n2
a(x, y) 7→ (a(x, xk), a(x, x3k), . . . , a(x, x(2n2−1)k)).
This map is essentially the canonical embedding of Z[y]/(yn2 + 1) where instead
of mapping into Z[epii/n2 ]n2 ⊂ Cn2 each component maps into the ring of integers
of the compositum of fields which is isomorphic to Z[x]/(xn1 + 1) in our case,
and extend this mapping to homomorphically in x. Thus we see that Θ is a ring
homomorphism. We denote by Θi the i’th component of Θ which is again a ring
homomorphism.
Just like the canonical embedding, the map Θ is injective. Write a(x, y) =∑n2−1
j=0 aj(x)y
j and let a be the vector of coefficients with respect to the power
basis in y: a = (a0(x), . . . , an2−1(x)). Then we have
Θ(a(x, y)) = a

1 1 · · · 1
xk x3k · · · x(2n2−1)k
x2k x6k · · · x(2n2−1)2k
...
...
. . .
...
x(n2−1)k x3(n2−1)k · · · x(2n2−1)(n2−1)k
 .
The matrix appearing above is a Vandermonde matrix and thus has determinant∏
0≤i<j<n2(x
(2j+1)k −x(2i+1)k) which is non-zero as the x(2i+1)k are distinct for
i ∈ [n2]. Hence Θ is injective and can thus be inverted. Further, for n2 > 2, the
absolute value of this determinant is a square root of the discriminant of the
number field Q(epii/n2). It is well known, see for example [19, Proposition 2.1],
that the discriminant is nn22 so that the determinant is one of ±nn2/22 . Hence for
odd q the corresponding map Θ modulo q which we denote by Θ¯, where the bar
denotes reduction modulo q, is also invertible, here we mean the map
Θ¯ : Zq[x, y]/(f(x), g(y))→ (Zq[x]/(f(x)))n2
a(x, y) 7→ (a(x, xk), a(x, x3k), . . . , a(x, x(2n2−1)k)).
The inverse mapping from the image of Θ (or Θ¯ if it exists) is given by multiply-
ing by the inverse of the Vandermonde matrix on the right. Denoting the Vander-
monde matrix by T = (Ti,j)i,j∈[n2] then its inverse is given by U = (Ui,j)i,j∈[n2]
where Ui,j =
1
n2
x−2jkTj,n2−i =
1
n2
x−j(2i+1)k where the indices are taken modulo
n2. To see this we compute
(TU)i,j =
n2−1∑
m=0
Ti,mUm,j =
n2−1∑
m=0
xi(2m+1)k 1n2x
−j(2m+1)k
=
1
n2
n2−1∑
m=0
x(i−j)(2m+1)k = δi,j .
We now look at how large the coefficients of t-th component of Θ(e(x, y)),
denoted Θt(e(x, y)), are if e(x, y) is sampled from the m-RLWE error distribu-
tion. We suppose that this error distribution has coefficients, with respect to the
basis xiyj , sampled independently from a distribution that is subgaussian with
parameter σ so writing e(x, y) =
∑n2−1
i=0
∑n1−1
j=0 ei,jx
jyi each ei,j is an indepen-
dent subgaussian random variable with parameter σ. Then applying Θt for some
t ∈ [n2] gives
Θt(e(x, y)) =
n2−1∑
i=0
n1−1∑
j=0
ei,jx
j+i(2t+1)k =
n1−1∑
j=0
(
n2−1∑
i=0
(−1)qi,jei,ri,j
)
xj
where we define qi,j and ri,j as the quotient and remainder of j − i(2t+ 1)k on
division by n1 (which depends on t): j− i(2t+ 1) = qi,jn1 + ri,j with ri,j ∈ [n1].
Thus we see that the coefficients of Θt(e(x, y)) are the sum of n2 subgaussians
with parameter σ and so are themselves subgaussian with parameter
√
n2σ.
4.3 Our Attack
Here we present a simple attack on the 2-RLWE problem. It combines both the
simple lattice attack and the distinguishing attack. We stress that the attack is
much more powerful that the distinguishing attack alone as firstly it solves a
search rather than a decisional problem and secondly there is no need for any
guessing during the attack.
We start with a number of samples {(aj(x, y), bj(x, y))}j∈[`] where bj(x, y) =
aj(x, y)s(x, y) + ej(x, y). The attack starts by computing the map Θ¯ on each
sample, we define αi,j(x) := Θ¯i(aj(x, y)) and βi,j(x) := Θ¯i(bj(x, y)). We note
that since Θ¯ is a ring homomorphism we have, on defining i,j(x) := Θ¯i(ej(x, y))
and σi(x) = Θ¯i(s(x, y)), that
βi,j(x) = αi,j(x)σi(x) + i,j(x) for i ∈ [n2], j ∈ [`].
Our first goal is to find the σi(x) and to do this we use the simple lattice
attack from Section 2.3 since for a fixed i the samples (αi,j(x), βi,j(x)) follow a
RLWEq,√n2Ψ distribution. This means we need to simply solve n2 instances of an
RLWE problem in dimension n1 with noise distribution that is
√
n2 times wider
than for the m-RLWE problem; each instance is independent so can be solved
in parallel. If this succeeds we have computed the image of s(x, y) under Θ¯ and
since Θ¯ is invertible for odd q we can compute s(x, y) and solve the 2-RLWE
problem.
We implemented and tested our attack in SageMath [18], using the NTL
library for lattice reduction. We tested our attack on the smallest parameter set
given in [14], namely for n1 = n2 = 128 and q being the smallest prime larger
than 242. The secret polynomial is sampled from the error distribution which
samples coefficients independently from a discrete Gaussian with σ = 3.19, larger
than the stated σ = 1 in the paper [14]. We were able to successfully recover the
secret polynomial with just one sample using BKZ reduction with block size 10 to
solve the BDD problem instances. This clearly shows that the estimated security
level of over 2500 bits, is grossly overestimated. We can see from the estimates
given by the LWE estimator [1] that also the parameter set with n1 = n2 = 256
and n1 = n2 = 512 offers little to no security (33 and 35 bits respectively) while
that for n1 = n2 = 1024 offers at most 98 bits.
In Table 1 we ran our attack with n1 ≥ n2 and q of the form 2p + 1 for
p ∈ N. The secret polynomial s we try to find is chosen uniformly at random
from Zq[x, y]/(xn1 + 1, yn2 + 1) so the minimum number of 2-RLWE samples
possible to recover s is two. We give the minimum q of the stated form for
which the attack succeeded with the stated number of samples; here we used
the embedding approach combined with BKZ reduction to attempt to solve the
BDD instances. Further, the coefficients of the error polynomials were sampled
independently using a discrete Gaussian sampler with σ = 3.19. The results are
heuristic as we only attempted to solve a limited number of instances for each
choice of n1, n2 and q. It is certainly possible to find the secret for smaller q
by increasing the block size used, and in specific instances this may not even be
necessary.
In Table 2 we performed the same attack but this time with the coefficients
of the secret polynomial taken from the uniform distribution on {−1, 0, 1}, hence
it is now possible for a successful attack with only one sample.
5 Optimizing module based cryptosystems
We take the example of Kyber [3] which when reduced to its simplest form has a
public key which is a module-LWE sample where the secret s is a small element
of the module Rkq where R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) with n a power of two. Such a
Table 1. The number of samples ` ≤ 3 and the minimal p ∈ N, p ≈ log2(q) for which
our attack succeeded in each of the stated number of attempts for the stated block size,
given n1, n2 and q = 2
p + 1, and where the secret polynomial is sampled uniformly at
random in Rq.
n1
4 8 16 32 64 128
instances 100 100 100 10 1 1
block size 30 30 30 30 10 10
` p ` p ` p ` p ` p ` p
n2
4
2 13 2 13 2 13 2 13 2 15 2 21
3 9 3 10 3 10 3 11 3 13 3 20
8
2 13 2 13 2 14 2 17 2 22
3 10 3 10 3 11 3 15 3 20
16
2 14 2 15 2 18 2 23
3 11 3 12 3 16 3 22
32
2 15 2 19 2 24
3 12 3 17 3 22
64
2 20 2 31
3 18 3 24
public key is then a pair (A,b) with A a k× k matrix whose entries are chosen
uniformly at random from Rq and b ∈ Rkq with b = As + e for some small error
element e ∈ Rkq . This means a public key consists of k(k + 1) elements of Rq.
One might be tempted to use a structured matrix, such as an anti-circulant one,
instead of a uniformly random one; after all this is essentially how one goes from
LWE to its ring based counterpart RLWE and with our current understanding
this latter optimization only incurs a negligible deterioration in security.
Let us fix some parameters and observe what happens. The suggested “para-
noid” parameters from [3] are to take k = 4 and n = 256 and q = 6781 which
gives a (post-quantum) security level of 218 bits, the largest given by the au-
thors. Taking the matrix A to be anti-circulant means only having 5 elements of
Rq define the public key instead of 20. Further, the scheme can be interpreted
as adding a ring structure on top of Rq in a new variable y satisfying y
4 + 1
and replacing matrix multiplication by ring multiplication. Hence, we are in the
m-RLWE setting and working in the tensor product of two power-of-two cyclo-
tomic fields of degrees 256 and 4 respectively. We can thus apply our attack
with n1 = 256 and n2 = 4 which shows that we can recover s by solving four
RLWE problems in dimension 256 from one sample where the error distribution
has variance twice that of the original error distribution. The LWE-estimator [1]
results in a security of this basic version of “multivariate-Kyber” of at most 107
bits, essentially halving the security. Thus there is a huge difference in terms
of security between going from LWE to RLWE and going from module-LWE to
m-RLWE if one is not careful.
Table 2. The number of samples ` ≤ 2 and the minimal p ∈ N, p ≈ log2(q) for which
our attack succeeded in the stated number of instances and with the stated block size,
given n1, n2 and q = 2
p+1, and where the secret polynomial is sampled coefficient-wise
with each coefficient uniformly random in {−1, 0, 1}.
n1
4 8 16 32 64 128
instances 100 100 100 10 1 1
block size 30 30 30 30 10 10
` p ` p ` p ` p ` p ` p
n2
4
1 11 1 12 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 22
2 9 2 9 2 10 2 11 2 13 2 20
8
1 13 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 22
2 10 2 10 2 11 2 14 2 21
16
1 14 1 14 1 17 1 22
2 11 2 12 2 15 2 21
32
1 15 1 18 1 23
2 12 2 16 2 22
64
1 20 1 25
2 17 2 23
We note this “multivariate-Kyber” would also be weak with the “light” pa-
rameter set where k = 2 but for the standard parameters where k = 3 the above
attack does not apply as 3 is not a power of two.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we reconsidered the m-RLWE problem and its security. We showed
that, with a combination of simple evaluation and lattice attacks, the security
of the m-RLWE problem is dramatically less than estimated in the current lit-
erature. We would therefore not recommend using 2-RLWE for values of n1 or
n2 less than those used in standard RLWE based schemes for cryptographic
purposes. More generally, we conclude that the m-RLWE problem using number
fields with a small degree compositum field is insecure. Finally, this paper should
also serve as a warning to implementers of module-LWE based cryptosystems
to not blindly apply the standard optimization trick that is used to transform
LWE into RLWE.
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